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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of manufacturing marijuana, possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
On appeal, Gosch challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
After conducting surveillance on property located in Hayden, Idaho,
Detective Terry Morgan obtained a search warrant to search "the premises of
11974 North Rimrock Road" and a "black 1996 Jeep . . . located in [the]
driveway"; Gosch lived at the residence and owned the Jeep identified in the
warrant.

(R., pp.31-33; Tr.

1

,

p.9, L.24- p.10, L.4.) The search warrant was

based upon probable cause to believe the property identified in the warrant
would contain evidence of drug crimes. (R., pp.31-33.) When law enforcement
executed the warrant, the Jeep was no longer at the residence; however, a white
2

Suzuki, which was registered to an unknown female and which was also present
during the earlier surveillance, was parked in the driveway. (Tr., p.9, L.13- p.1 0,
L.12.) A certified drug dog alerted on the Suzuki and a subsequent search of
that car revealed marijuana and a "white powder substance," suspected to be

1

There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript
of the suppression hearing is included twice -as an individual transcript and as
part of days one and two of the jury trial. All transcript references in this brief will
be to the individual suppression hearing transcript.
2
Law enforcement later determined the Suzuki also belonged to Gosch. (See
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-21; R., p.21.)

1

cocaine.

(R., p.35; Tr., p.80, L.25- p.82, L.12, p.86, L.21- p.93, L.7, p.109,

L.24 - p.11 0, L.9.)

Several drug-related items were also located in Gosch's

residence. (R., pp.35-36.)
The state charged Gosch with trafficking in cocaine, manufacturing
marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and possession of
marijuana in excess of three ounces.

(R., pp.46-48, 57-59.)

Gosch filed a

motion to suppress, asserting "the warrant was insufficient and/or the search was
warrantless and/or the arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal
justification." (R., p.67.) The district court denied the motion as well as Gosch's
subsequent request for an interlocutory appeal regarding his request for
suppression. (R., pp.154-163, 186, 201-203.) Gosch proceeded to trial at which
a jury found him guilty of manufacturing marijuana, possession of marijuana with
intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, but
acquitted him of the trafficking in cocaine charge. (R., pp.266-267.) The court
imposed concurrent unified five-year sentences with three years fixed, but
suspended the sentences and placed Gosch on probation.

3

(R., pp.314-320.)

Gosch timely appealed from the Amended Judgment, re-filed pursuant to
relief granted in post-conviction. (R., pp.346, 350-353.)

3

One month after the court placed Gosch on probation, the state filed a Report
of Probation Violation. (R., pp.321-324.) Gosch admitted the allegations and
disposition of the violations was included in a global resolution involving other
criminal charges, which resulted in revocation of Gosch's probation and
reduction of the fixed terms of his sentences from three years to one year. (R.,
pp.333-340, 343-345.)
Gosch notes in his brief that he has served his
sentences. (Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

2

ISSUE
Gosch states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gosch's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Should this Court affirm the district court's order denying Gosch's motion
to suppress on one of the following bases: (1) an authorized search of particular
premises includes vehicles located on the premises; (2) the automobile
exception applies to vehicles parked at a residence without affirmative proof that
the automobile is "readily mobile"; or (3) inevitable discovery?

3

ARGUMENT
Gosch Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Gosch challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing

suppression was required "because the State failed to prove that the white
Suzuki parked at his residence was 'readily mobile,"' and therefore failed to
prove the automobile exception applied.
argument fails for several reasons.

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

Gosch's

Because the Suzuki was located on the

premises authorized to be searched pursuant to the warrant, the search of the
Suzuki was proper regardless of the applicability of the automobile exception.
Even if the Suzuki is not considered part of the premises, the search was proper
under the automobile exception because the information available to law
enforcement supported the conclusion that it was readily mobile and the district
court correctly concluded as much.

Finally, the inevitable discovery doctrine

prevents exclusion of any evidence recovered from the Suzuki in this case.
Gosch has, therefore, failed to show error in the denial of his suppression
motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The credibility of the

4

witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district
court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The Suzuki Was Properly Searched As Part Of The Premises
The search warrant issued by the magistrate authorized a search of the

premises located at 11974 Rimrock Road in Hayden, Idaho.

(R., p.33.) The

testimony presented at the suppression hearing established that the Suzuki,
along with Gosch's Jeep and a white GMC truck were parked in the driveway at
Gosch's residence on Rimrock Road and one of the detectives conducting
surveillance on the day the warrant was obtained and executed observed Gosch
and other individuals carrying items out of the residence and placing them in the
vehicles parked in the driveway, including the Suzuki. (Tr., p.7, L.16- p.9, L.16,
p.40, L.1 0 - p.43, L.17.)

The district court's Memorandum Opinion supports

these factual findings (R., pp.155-156), Gosch does not dispute them (see
generally Appellant's Brief, p.2), and these facts support a conclusion that the
Suzuki was properly searched as part of the premises identified in the warrant.
United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (1oth Cir. 1990), is instructive.
In Gottschalk, "a magistrate issued a valid warrant authorizing the search
of the residence of William Bailey located in Copperton, Utah, as well as two
other nearby residences. Neither Gottschalk nor his vehicle were mentioned in
the warrant, and Gottschalk was not a target of the investigation or the warrant."
915 F.2d at 1459-1460. In fact, the "warrant did not specifically list any vehicles
to be searched, but rather authorized the search of the entire premises for

5

methamphetamine"

and

methamphetamine.

kL at

other

items

related

to

the

manufacture

of

1460. When the search was conducted, Gottschalk's

vehicle, a yellow Cadillac, was "parked in the driveway of the Bailey residence in
an inoperable state," and had been for several weeks.

kL

In addition, an

informant reported seeing the suspects "moving objects from the trunk of a
yellow automobile parked in the driveway into Bailey's garage."

kL

Gottschalk's

Cadillac was searched based on a "belief that the Cadillac was the yellow vehicle
described by the informant, and because the car was parked on the premises
where abundant evidence of drug trafficking and weapons offenses had already
been found."

kL

Law enforcement also believed the Cadillac "might be another

stolen vehicle," since a "number of stolen vehicles and stolen car parts were
found during the search of the three residences."

kL

as engine parts were found in the Cadillac's trunk.

kL

Several weapons as well

The district court suppressed the evidence found in the Cadillac after
concluding the search was improper since Bailey, "the owner of the premises
described in the search warrant, was not the owner of the Cadillac and because
the evidence did not establish that the Cadillac was under his dominion and
control," taking it outside of the search authorized by the warrant Gottschalk,
915 F.2d at 1460. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
A search warrant authorizing a search of a certain premises
generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if the
objects of the search might be located therein. One circuit has
added a limitation to the general rule: that the vehicle to be
searched must be owned or controlled by the owner of the
premises searched. Although this limitation has been applauded
by some commentators, it has been explicitly rejected by at least
one circuit and several other courts.

6

Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461 (internal case citations, quotations, and ellipsis
omitted).
Because the Suzuki was on the premises of the address authorized to be
searched and because the objects of the search might have been (and were)
located therein, the search of the Suzuki was proper under the warrant.

The

failure to specifically identify the Suzuki or any other vehicle in the warrant, as
the Jeep was, does not mean the rule articulated in Gottschalk does not apply.
Indeed, specifically identifying the Jeep merely served the purpose of allowing
the Jeep to be searched regardless of its location. In fact, consistent with this
point, the Jeep was not on the premises when the warrant was executed but was
located and returned to Rimrock Road and searched after the warrant issued.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.3-5, p.23, L17- p.25, L12.)
Even applying the limitation stated in Gottschalk - that the scope of the
warrant "include[s] those automobiles either actually owned or under the control
and dominion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles which
appear, based on objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the
search, to be so controlled," 915 F.2d at 1461 -the search of the Suzuki would
still fall squarely within the premises authorized by the warrant in this case based
on the movement of items from Gosch's residence into the car and the discovery
that the Suzuki was his.

Compare Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461-1462.

This

Court can therefore affirm the district court's order denying Gosch's suppression
motion on this basis.

See Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County

Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ("an

7

appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative legal basis
supports it"); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123
Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the district court is
correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the
correct theory").

D.

The Search Of Gosch's Vehicle Was Justified By Probable Cause To
Believe It Contained Contraband
Even if the warrant's authorization to search the premises did not

encompass the Suzuki, the search of the Suzuki was appropriate pursuant to the
automobile exception.

"There are ... exceptions to the general rule that a

warrant must be secured before a search is undertaken; one is the so-called
'automobile exception."' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). The
automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle and the
containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of criminal activity. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
572 (1991 ); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982).

"Probable

cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items
to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime."

State v.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823; see also Florida v. Harris,_ U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 1050,
1055 (2013).

"[W]hen a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully

stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has

8

probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search
it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005).
A reliable drug-detection dog alerted on the Suzuki, providing probable
cause to believe the Suzuki contained drugs. The district court found as much
and Gosch concedes this fact on appeal. (R., p.162; Appellant's Brief, p. 12 n.3
("Mr. Gosch does not challenge the district court's holding that the State had
probable cause once the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. An alert by a reliable,
trained canine unit provides probable cause.").) Instead, Gosch argues that the
district court erred in finding the Suzuki was "readily mobile," contending the
state had the burden of proving such and failed to do so.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.5-12.) Gosch is incorrect.
In Carney, the Supreme Court noted its cases "have consistently
recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile
exception."

471 U.S. at 390.

"The mobility of automobiles . . . creates

circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous
enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible." l5;L at 391 (citation and
quotations omitted). "However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the
original justification for the vehicle exception, ... later cases have made clear
that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception." l5;L "Besides the
element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than
that relating to one's home or office."

9

Jsi

(citation and quotations omitted).

Accordingly, "[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile,
the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle
justified application of the vehicular exception."

kl

"These reduced expectations

of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view,
but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways."

kl at 392 (citation omitted).

While "ready mobility" is one of the justifications underlying the automobile
exception, the Supreme Court has never held that the state has the burden of
proof of the existence of the justifications for the exception in any particular case.
Rather, the automobile exception allows a warrantless search where there is
probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a
crime. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148. While the state has the
burden of proving the existence of probable cause, it does not have the burden
of proving one or more of the justifications for the exception. Gosch has cited no
authority to the contrary. (See Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Gosch's argument to the
contrary is premised upon the following italicized language from Carney, which,
in context, reads:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is
readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not
regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise-the
two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the
vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if
not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of
privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject
to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At
least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in
effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the
vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.

10

471 U.S. at 392-393 (quoted, in part, in Appellant's Brief at p.11) (emphasis
added).
According to Gosch, the italicized language above precludes the search
of the Suzuki under the automobile exception because the Suzuki "was not being
used on the highway and it was found stationary at a residence" and therefore
"[t]he two justifications for the exception are not in play here." (Appellant's Brief,
p.11.) The Suzuki's location does not establish that it was not readily mobile nor
subject to regulation.

A vehicle is not readily mobile only when it is actually

mobile or has been seen driving. If that were true, the term "readily" would be
superfluous in expressing the rationale for the automobile exception and the
entire purpose of the exception vvould be undermined because the point is to
allow a search of the automobile before it moves, i.e., becomes unavailable.
Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Carney applied the
automobile exception to a motor home that was never seen moving.

kl

at 388.

Nor does the Suzuki's presence in Gosch's driveway demonstrate, as Gosch
contends, that the regulation justification is "not in play." Regardless, as noted,
the state was not required to prove the existence of any underlying justification,
including that the Suzuki was in fact regulated, in order for the automobile
exception to apply.
With respect to Gosch's argument that the automobile exception does not
apply when a car is parked in a place "regularly used for residential purposes"
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly rejected
this interpretation of the language of Carney. The defendant in United States v.

11

Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1529 (10 1h Cir. 1993), made a similar argument to which
the court responded: "... Ludwig misunderstands Carney. The question is only
whether the 'vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude
that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle."' As in Ludwig, the
Suzuki was "obviously not being used as a residence" and could, therefore, be
searched under the automobile exception once there was probable cause to
believe it contained contraband. kL
Even if the state was required to prove the Suzuki was "readily mobile," it
met its burden in this case. On this point, the district court correctly concluded.
In the present case, Defendant contends that since the
Suzuki "was not about to be moved" and was "secure where it
was," the mobility concerns that justify the automobile exception
were not present when the Suzuki was searched without a warrant.
. . . Here, the Suzuki was located in a driveway in close proximity
to Defendant's residence. There was no testimony that it was
mounted on blocks, had flat tires or was otherwise inoperable. Cf.
1
[United States v.l Hatley, [15 F.3d 856, 859 (9 h Cir. 1994)].
Contrary to Defendant's argument, the actions of the Defendant on
the day of the search indicated that he was using, or was about to
use, both the Suzuki and the Jeep to transport belongings from his
residence to another location, which in and of itself indicates that
the Suzuki was capable of being moved in the manner
contemplated by the automobile exception. The fact that the
Suzuki was parked in a residence driveway and without an operator
when the warrantless search commenced does not place the
Suzuki outside of the automobile exception.
(R., p.161.)
Gosch's only argument that the court's finding of ready mobility is
erroneous is that "simply placing property in a vehicle is insufficient to
demonstrate that the vehicle is readily mobile, especially when a car is parked at
a residence - the trunk of a vehicle can be used for storage just as easily as for

12

transport."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) While Gosch's storage hypothesis could

theoretically be true, this does not mean the facts cited by the court are
inadequate to establish ready mobility. Cf. State v. Nicolescu, 156 Idaho 287,
_ , 323 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Ct. App. 2014) ("the existence of an alternative
innocent explanation does not negate the fact that the officers had reasonable
grounds to believe Nicolescu was intoxicated"). Gosch suggests that, in order to
establish ready mobility, there must be evidence that the car "has been recently
driven."

4

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

Not only is this evidentiary standard

unsupported by any authority, it is contrary to the purpose of the exception and
to cases applying it.

See,~.

Carney, supra.

Gosch is incorrect in his assertion that the state is required to prove one
or more of the underlying justifications underlying the automobile exception in
order for the exception to apply.

Even if the Court concludes otherwise, the

district court's conclusion that the Suzuki was readily mobile is supported by the
evidence. Gosch has failed to establish otherwise.

E.

Even If The Search Of The Suzuki Was Not Proper Pursuant To The
Warrant Or The Automobile Exception, The Evidence In The Suzuki
Would Have Inevitably Been Discovered
Assuming that the search of the Suzuki was not properly included as part

of the premises or did not fall within the automobile exception, exclusion of the
evidence discovered therein would be improper under the inevitable discovery

4

Gosch "does not disagree with the district court that the fact the Suzuki was not
about to be moved means that a vehicle is not readily mobile." (Appellant's Brief,
p.10.)
13

doctrine. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812813 (Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the
exclusionary rule).

Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of

proof that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful
means, then exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually
obtained by constitutionally improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001).
The underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the
prosecution in the same position it would have been absent the police
misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at
102, 57 P.3d at 813.
In response to Gosch's suppression motion, the state sought application
of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the event the district court found the search
otherwise improper. (R., pp.88-89.) After seeing the items moved from Gosch's
home to the Suzuki and obtaining a positive alert on the Suzuki, the police
undoubtedly would have been able to obtain a separate search warrant for the
Suzuki. Indeed, Gosch concedes on appeal that probable cause to search the
Suzuki existed "once the dog alerted on the vehicle."

(Appellant's Brief, p.12

n.3.) Application of the inevitable discovery doctrine would, therefore, prevent
exclusion of any evidence from the Suzuki in this case.

14

F.

if This Court Concludes That The Suzuki Was Not Properly Searched
Under Any Theory, Any Error In The Denial Of The Suppression Motion Is
Harmless At Least As To Gosch's Conviction For Manufacturing
Marijuana
An error "will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to declare,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the
event complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho
533, 537, 285 P.3d 348, 352 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). If this Court finds
error in the denial of the suppression, any error is harmless at least as to the
manufacturing marijuana charge.
The manufacturing marijuana charge was based on "compounding or
converting or processing marijuana into honey oil" and the jury was so instructed.
(R., pp.58, 167, 252.)

The honey oil was found in Gosch's home along with

several other items related to the manufacture of marijuana.

(See R., p.35.)

Thus, even assuming the evidence in the Suzuki should have been suppressed,
there was still ample evidence to, at a minimum, convict Gosch of manufacturing
marijuana. 5
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the
district court's order denying Gosch's motion to suppress.
DATED this 3rd day of July 2014.

5

Because the jury acquitted Gosch of trafficking in cocaine (R., p.266),
suppression of the cocaine found in the Suzuki (R., p.35) would be moot.
15
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